(This is Part 18 of a series. Go back to Part 17.)
The twelfth sub-principle used for concentrating strength against weakness is to:
12. Attack when the enemy is confused or demoralised.
By using this principle, Stonewall Jackson, the greatest general in the U.S. Civil War, was able to pull off one of the most brilliant military campaigns of all time in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862.
Beginning with a Confederate force of only 4600 men (later up to 17,000), Jackson was able to tie down, defeat or disable three Union armies totalling almost 80,000 men. He did this by working on the minds of the Union commanders—from President Lincoln on down—until they were so demoralised that they couldn't act rationally.
In 1862 the main Union army under general McClellan was beseiging Richmond, the Confederate capital. McClellan felt that he didn't have enough troops for the attack and implored Lincoln to send him McDowell's army of 40,000, stationed not far from Washington.
Jackson's challenge, with his tiny force, was to prevent that link-up, as well as to prevent two other armies, 23,000 under Nathaniel Banks and 15,000 under John Fremont, from joining together against him or linking up with McDowell's army.
His first move was a surprise attack, with only 3000 men, on Banks' army at Kernstown. Though defeated, Jackson's near-victory so alarmed President Lincoln that he ordered McDowell and his 40,000, marching to join McClelland, to halt and await developments.
Jackson retreated south and then marched his men east, convincing all concerned that he was going to attack McDowell and perhaps Washington. Secretly, he then loaded his soldiers on a train that took them rapidly west, where he suddenly appeared at Staunton, the central position between Fremont's and Bank's armies.
Jackson immediately attacked the surprised Fremont and drove him so far back that Fremont and his army became
hors de combat.
Returning at lightning speed, Jackson then executed a "maneuver on the rear" against Banks' army that was so devastating that Banks became temporarily frozen, like a deer in the headlights. Though Banks urgently needed to withdraw, he delayed giving the order for 24 hours because he couldn't function.
Because of this delay, Jackson was able to execute an adroit flank attack that defeated Banks at the Battle of Winchester on May 25th—an outcome that sent Banks reeling backwards and set off a panic in Washington, where Lincoln again prevented McDowell's army from joining McClelland at Richmond.
Now the Union was bound and determined to eliminate Jackson and ordered two greatly superior forces to chase him down the Shenandoah Valley and crush him. But once again Jackson managed to get in the central position between the armies and rapidly defeated first one and then the other at the Battle of Port Republic on June 9th.
Through his brilliant maneuvers in 1862 Jackson staved off three armies, prevented the fall of Richmond and gave the Confederacy another three years of life.
Our final example is the German general Erwin Rommel, who with vastly inferior forces in the North African desert in 1941-42 came very close to completely eliminating the British from the Mediterranean and the Mideast, an event which would have had incredible consequences.
Hitler never realized the strategic value of North Africa. To him it was unimportant. But his ally Mussolini had invaded Libya and had taken a beating from the British. Now Hitler was afraid that Musslini might leave the Axis coalition if he was not stiffened with some support.
So Hitler sent Rommel to Libya. Hitler didn't much care about North Africa and simply wanted to make a show of support for Mussolini. Consequently, he sent only a single panzer (tank) division to Libya with Rommel. Hitler didn't expect results there—but neither did he understand what a general like Rommel can do.
The battles in North Africa in 1941-42 were tank battles. Rommel understood immediately that the desert is like the ocean, in that tanks can move in any direction over the desert much like ships at sea. In such an environment, he knew, speed and mobility were the key.
Rommel was always greatly outnumbered in his tank campaigns, sometimes by 2-to-1 or 3-to-1, sometimes by as much as 6-to-1.
To counteract this he always acted with extreme speed, continually catching the British by surprise. While they favored frontal attacks, Rommel consistently used flank and rear attacks. He frequently achieved local superiority by rapid concentration. He consistently used "maneuvers on the rear." He used, in other words, every principle discussed in these articles and then some.
But perhaps one of them stands out: Rommel consistently mystified and demoralized the British, to the point that their actions became increasingly panicky and disoriented.
Rommel never gave the British time to rest but went from one blow to the next, one outflanking movement to the next, one disorientation to the next, so that the British could never recover their equilibrium.
In the end, Rommel came within 60 miles of Alexandria with only 26 tanks left. Yet so great was his reputation by then that the British in Alexandria were burning important papers and the Royal Navy had pulled out of port.
But Rommel could go no further. Against overwhelming odds he had driven the British across North Africa to their headquarters in Egypt, but now his men were exhausted and he was out of tanks and everything else. Meanwhile the British, close to their supplies, managed to build up an overwhelming force of men, tanks, planes and artillery.
Now Rommel did the most difficult military maneuver of all—an orderly retreat in the face of overwhelming attack. He proved his brilliance as a general all over again by conducting an immensely difficult retreat over hundreds of miles without ever letting his men become trapped.
(This is the end of Part 18. Go to Part 19.)
—jim sloman, 8.30.03 for 8.15.04
|
