(This is Part 12 of a series. Go back to Part 11.)
The sixth sub-principle for concentrating strength against weakness is to:
6. Create a diversion before the main attack.
A good example of this occurred in 1917-18 during World War I. At that time Palestine was occupied by the Turks, commanded by German officers. As part of the Allied effort, British general Edmund Allenby was given the job of pushing north from Egypt and defeating the Turkish army in Palestine.
Allenby faced a formidable task. The Turks were well dug-in along a fortified line stretching from Gaza on the Mediterranean coast to Beersheeba 40 miles to the east.
The Turkish army, with its left flank protected by the Judean Hills and its right flank at the Mediterranean, felt well-prepared for anything the British could do. Allenby had to overcome this obstacle; but how?
German commander von Kressenstein expected Allenby to invade at Gaza on the coast, because 1) it was closest to Allenby's supply lines to Egypt and 2) British warships could give artillery support at that point.
But Allenby knew better than to attack where he was expected. Instead, he followed military theoretician B. H. Liddell Hart's maxim to always attack along the line of least expectation.
Allenby decided to invade at Beersheeba, where he was least expected—but he knew that he had to distract the Turks by convincing them that he would invade at Gaza.
In an elaborate scheme, Allenby arranged for a British intelligence officer to "accidentally" stray too far into the desert carrying a knapsack filled with fake papers. Chased by Turkish soldiers and pretending to be wounded, he dropped the bloodstained knapsack in the desert.
Most of the papers inside the knapsack—discovered by the Turks, of course—were innocent, but a few were carefully prepared forgeries indicating that the British attack would appear to come at Beersheeba but would actually come at Gaza. Von Kressenstein became convinced by these forgeries.
To deepen the deception, Allenby had a major artillery barrage directed at the Gaza line for several days. This served to further fix the enemy's attention on Gaza.
Meanwhile, leaving dummies and tents behind at Gaza, Allenby secretly moved his army to Beersheeba. When Allenby attacked at Beersheeba it came as a complete surprise to the Turks and they were soon overcome.
The fall of Beersheeba, in turn, cracked the Turkish line, precipitating a retreat north from Jerusalem and the creation of a new fortified line from Jaffa on the coast to the Jordan Valley inland.
Again Allenby had to attack—but how to do so against heavily defended positions? Once more Allenby chose to distract the enemy's attention. However this time he did it in reverse, by pretending to attack in the east while actually concentrating his forces at Jaffa on the coast.
To create this new deception, Allenby ordered a number of "demonstrations" in the Jordan Valley. Mule-drawn sleighs created large dust clouds, giving the impression of marching troops. And Allenby had British troops march noisily to the valley, steal away during the night and then march in again, day after day.
As this was happening, Allenby's cavalry was spirited away to the west and hidden amongst orange groves on the coast—while the cavalry's camps in the east were left standing and 15,000 dummy canvas horses were set up to deceive arial observers. The enemy's attention remained fixed on the Jordan Valley.
When Allenby's attack suddenly came at Jaffa on the coast the Turks were completely surprised. British cavalry now drove north through the Plains of Sharon, then wheeled east and cut off the line of retreat of the Turkish army, which then collapsed.
Allenby's adroit diversions caused the destruction of the Turkish army and the fall of Palestine, Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia. Such is the power of distracting the enemy's attention.
(This is the end of Part 12. Go to Part 13.)
—jim sloman, 8.22.03 for 6.20.04
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