(This is Part 13 of a series. Go back to Part 12.)
The seventh method for concentrating strength against weakness is to:
7. Attack when you are not expected.
Alexander the Great understood this method well; he was renowned for the rapidity of his movements and thus his ability to surprise his opponents.
For example, Alexander was just 20 years old in 336 BC when his father was assassinated and he ascended to the throne of Macedon (northern Greece). The Greek city-states, sensing the young king's weakness, declared their hostile intentions towards him.
Alexander's response was characteristic. Without pausing even to organize his kingdom, he and his army hurtled down the mainland of Greece, arriving in the midst of the Greek city-states before they could form their armies. Instead of attacking him, the Greeks swore allegiance.
Note that Alexander accomplished this purely by surprise, without waging a single battle.
Hannibal also understood this principle. After Rome's humbling of Carthage in the First Punic War, the young Carthaginian general was anxious to avenge the defeat.
The Romans were not concerned about an invasion. An invasion from the south—by sea—would be fruitless because Rome controlled the seas. And an invasion from the north was impossible because the invading army would have to cross the Alps in winter—an impossibility.
Yet Hannibal did cross the Alps. The crossing was so incredibly difficult that he lost half his army. However the remainder descended suddenly upon the Roman rear, catching the Romans completely by surprise and leading directly to huge victories by Hannibal at the Battles of Trebbia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae.
Napoleon went so far as to say that, "In war, the basic element of all successful strategies is surprise," and he certainly illustrated that maxim in his military campaigns.
In the spring and summer of 1805 Napoleon was on the coast of France preparing an invasion of England, his most implacable enemy.
During this time England had formed the Third Coalition with Russia and Austria. Two Russian Armies, assembling under Generals Kutusov and Benigsen, were to join up by late October with a large Austrian army assembling near Vienna.
Meanwhile a fourth army of 60,000, under Austrian General Mack, was sent during the late summer to the town of Ulm as a precaution against Napoleon's possible approach from the west.
But General Mack was not concerned. He knew that the French army, concentrated on the Atlantic coast, could not possibly show up at Ulm before mid-November.
But Mack didn't count on Napoleon's extreme rapidity. By late August the French army had been turned around and propelled on a secret movement towards Austria. To mask what was happening, the various army corps were split up and directed along different paths.
Throughout the month of September the French armies kept up an incredible pace of 22 miles a day. In fact, the soldiers joked that Napoleon had created a new weapon of war that used their legs instead of their bayonets—and they were right.
Given the logistical tools available in 1805, coordinating these huge and independent movements was a feat of great strategic brilliance. As his carriage rolled eastward towards Austria Napoleon issued a ceaseless stream of orders coordinating the complex movements and logistical supplies of the various armies.
The first French troops crossed the Rhine on September 25th and by October 2nd the various army corps had begun wheeling south towards Ulm to envelope it.
In the meantime General Mack, secure in the knowledge that Napoleon's army could not be anywhere near him, took his time making preparations for defense.
Though Mack didn't know it, by October 7th his army was surrounded. By October 15th the web had been tightened and Mack at last realized his true situation.
There was nothing "the unhappy General Mack" could do at that point; on October 20th his entire army surrendered. Through rapidity and surprise Napoleon had brought about the collapse of an entire army without a battle.
(This is the end of Part 13. Go to Part 14.)
—jim sloman, 8.23.03 for 6.29.04
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