(This is Part 19 of a series. Go back to Part 18.)
How to sum up this series on military strategy?
War itself is a gruesome business. It's worth remembering that war necessarily involves killing other human beings. We can speak about "shattering an army," but what that means is that real human beings got their life snuffed out, real human beings got maimed and wounded.
The generals discussed here are considered "great" not because of their respect for human life, but because of their insight into the strategy and tactics of winning in the face of great odds.
But our "great" generals, almost without exception, were capable of being quite ruthless on occasion, though for sure some more than others. Genghis Khan, for example, though undeniably a brilliant strategist, thought nothing of slaughtering whole cities of 50,000 inhabitants.
But all of our generals were capable of ruthlessness to some extant. And they all practiced deception—otherwise they didn't get to be great generals.
Indeed, I've come to feel that the essential element of great military strategy is deception, or to put it another way, diversion. As far as I can tell, all brilliant military strategies are variations on the standard modus operandi of the magician: "Watch what I'm doing with my left hand while I do something else with my right."
That is, great generals find a way to get the enemy's attention focused on something other than how or when or from where the real attack is coming. Like a magician, a great general succeeds in distracting the enemy's attention before he attacks.
When mediocre generals attack frontally, as they are wont to do, the enemy is prepared for them. The enemy not only knows where the attack is coming from, but is ready for it; his attention is fully focused there. That is the essential reason why direct frontal attacks are so often suicidal and futile.
All of the 12 sub-principles (of the general principle to
concentrate strength against weakness) involve a strong element of diverting the enemy's attention.
1) When Hannibal ambushed and destroyed the marching Roman army at Lake Trasimene, the Roman general Flaminus had his attention on getting quickly to Rome, not on a flank attack from troops hidden in the hills.
2) When Scippio attacked the Carthaginian army at night while it was in camp, the enemy's attention was on rest and sleep, not on an imminent attack.
3) When the Greek general Miltiades attacked the Persians at the Battle of Marathon, the Persians' attention was on the fact that their back was to the sea and that they had no line of retreat, not on the unexpected attack on their flanks.
4) When Napoleon used his plan of "strategic battle" at Castiglione, the Austrian general's attention was focused on the sudden assault on his rear and not on the "joint" or weakness in his front line created by pulling back his left flank to defend against the rear attack.
5) When Napoleon pretended that he was weak at Austerlitz, the enemy was focused on their "successful" attack against his weak right flank, not on the gap in their center created by it.
6) When Allenby attack the Turks in Palestine, their attention was focused on his prominent "demonstrations" along the coast, where his deceptive espionage plant had pointed, and not inland where the real attack suddenly materialised.
7) When Napoleon surrounded the Austrian general Mack at Ulm, Mack's attention was focused on the fact that he was secure for the time being because Napoleon was too far away to be anywhere near him for another month.
8) When Rommel attacked the British during his campaign in the desert their attention was focused on chasing Rommel's "retreating" tanks, not on the fact that they were now vulnerable to a flank attack.
9) When Lawrence of Arabia attacked the Turks at the strategic port of Aquaba, their attention was on a possible attack by sea, where their big guns were pointed, not on an "impossible" attack on their rear across an impassable desert.
10) When Scippio assaulted New Carthage, Hannibal's attention was focused on his maneuvers against the Roman armies in Italy, not on his own supply lines coming through the "secure" colony of Spain.
11) When Napoleon unexpectedly occupied the "central position" between the Piedmontese and Austrian armies in 1796, their attention was focused on the "fact" that his rag-tag army was still unorganized and therefore couldn't attack their divided armies yet.
12) When Jackson feinted brilliantly east during the Shenandoah Valley campaign in 1862, the Union generals were focused on a possible attack on Washington, not on his sudden appearance among one of their armies dozens of miles to the west.
Thus we see that virtually all successful military strategies involve some variation of finding or creating a way to distract the enemy's attention—the magician's left hand—before the real attack—the magician's right hand. This is the common thread of all strategies involving the principle of concentrating strength against weakness.
(This is the end of Part 19. Go to Part 20.)
—jim sloman, 9.29.03 for 10.18.04
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